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Explanation through Analogical Reasoning in Aristotle’s Natural Science 
I. Introduction: Analogical Reasoning and Explanation in Aristotle’s Science 
Analogy features prominently in Aristotle’s writing; yet, the scholarship rarely treats 
Aristotle’s scientific use of analogy—or its use in any area—apart from its literary merits. The 
few works that do discuss analogy in Aristotle’s scientific writings tend to make two simple 
characterizations. The first, the weaker reading, sees analogy as serving a didactic function only 
and as carrying no explanatory force. It takes analogy to be something along the lines of an 
example or illustration, something that supports or embellishes the argument or explanation, 
while not being integral to Aristotle’s investigation or causal accounts. On this view, Aristotle 
uses analogy to comfort or instruct the reader rather than as part of his methods of inquiry.1 The 
second, which offers a somewhat stronger reading, considers analogy to be a heuristic device 
towards the generation of genuine causal explanations. On this reading, analogy functions as 
something that guides Aristotle’s investigation and discovery of an explanation but is not itself 
part of that explanation and, therefore, does not carry any explanatory force itself.2 No doubt, 
both didactic and heuristic uses of analogies are part of Aristotle’s writings and are quite 
common forms of analogy in his corpus. As I argue in the present essay, however, there is a 
third, largely overlooked type of analogy at play in Aristotle’s scientific treatises, namely, 
reasoning by analogy. While didactic analogies illustrate a phenomenon that is explainable in 
other ways and heuristic analogies can help lead one to an explanation, in analogical reasoning, 
the analogy itself functions as the explanation. This makes reasoning by analogy a potentially 
powerful method of scientific investigation.3 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Sedley, ch. 6, § 2; Johnson 126 and passim; Broadie; Lennox 133–4, 184ff., 230–2. 
2 See, for instance, Leunissen 115–21, 130; Falcon and Leunissen. 
3 M. Hesse, in her “Aristotle’s Logic of Analogy,” offers the only extensive discussion of the relevance of analogy 
as explanation in Aristotle’s scientific investigation. Analogies, she contends, are useful scientific tools of inference 
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Analogical reasoning, as it concerns the present inquiry, is a kind of reasoning according 
to which one pulls certain causal elements from a source object, which is more familiar and 
better understood, and applies them to, or maps them onto, a target object, in the hopes of 
explaining the target through its similarity to the source. Reasoning by analogy is, here, a mode 
of causal inference. It works by postulating the existence of an ontological causal 
correspondence between certain elements of the objects of the two domains in question, such that 
the causal explanation that is available for the well-known source domain is transferable to the 
lesser-known target domain. That what is invoked in the postulation is an ontological causal 
correspondence is key, since analogical reasoning aims at causal explanation beyond stating the 
mere epistemic reason why. Generally, the two domains of the analogy must be significantly 
different in at least one respect (since otherwise the two domains would be identical in type), 
although the degree of difference may vary. 
For the argument of the present essay, a basic understanding of the structure of analogy is 
sufficient. Analogy is a four-term comparison of the typical form A is to B as C is to D, with the 
A and B side being a familiar source domain or process and the C and D side being an unfamiliar 
target domain or process. What analogical reasoning has beyond the typical four-term analogy 
structure is the characteristic of allowing one to draw inferences. These inferences are initially 
directly from the A and B relation to the C and D relation, but they can extend further, if the 
analogy allows for such elaboration. This involves the supposition of sufficient similarity in the 
relevant ways between the source (the familiar side, A and B) and the target (the less familiar 
side, C and D). In the sort of analogical reasoning with which the present essay is most 
concerned—cases in which analogical reasoning contributes to Aristotle’s scientific 
                                                          
that Aristotle effectively employs. Further, she argues that this may be his most important and lasting contribution to 
science. 
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explanation—the affinities between source and target are principally causal. There is much 
discussion today around how to assess analogical affinity properly and determine appropriate 
inferences; however, the present essay concerns itself with the way Aristotle uses analogical 
reasoning in practice, since he leaves the matter untheorized. 
The scholarship has often overlooked, misunderstood, and miscategorized this type of 
analogical reasoning; yet, Aristotle employs it to great effect in his works of natural science. 
Aristotle’s causal language is rich, and his explanations are not confined to those consisting only 
of demonstrations. Aristotle especially turns to analogical reasoning when he is at the limit of 
empirical observation and where other types of explanation or other methods to arrive at 
explanations fall short. This is also why the type of analogical reasoning I am interested in 
appears relatively frequently in Aristotelian treatises that deal with empirically underdetermined 
domains, such as embryology. 
Cases of analogical reasoning are those in which the causes postulated through the 
analogy were otherwise not immediately available in what is observable. Since the collection of 
helpful empirical data in that domain is usually either impossible or unlikely to happen, Aristotle 
sorts out the material and tries to explain it by way of analogical reasoning. Although Aristotle 
does not discuss it explicitly and does not develop a formal account of analogical reasoning in 
his scientific writings, the present essay maintains that analogical reasoning (and its key 
component of ontological causal inference) serves as explanation in a way that is already evident 
in Aristotle’s works of natural science. Aristotle uses analogical reasoning to explain a 
phenomenon that is mostly hidden from empirical investigation. He does so by identifying a 
phenomenon that is well known and open to empirical investigation and that he thinks is 
somehow—structurally or causally—similar to the unknown domain. By identifying a relevant 
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source domain, it is possible—by drawing out the analogy between the target and the source 
domain—to explain the target domain. However, in doing this, the analogy itself is the 
explanation—there is nothing further to offer, nothing that would yield an explanation 
independent from the analogy. In lieu of relying on direct observation, analogical reasoning 
provides Aristotle with a way to continue his scientific investigations and to provide causal 
explanations.4 
While Aristotle has his own theory of analogy (analogia), it is not immediately germane 
to the discussion of analogical reasoning, besides providing the four-term structure already 
explicated.5 The present essay’s interest lies in the extent to which Aristotle uses analogies to 
infer causal similarities and thereby constitute explanations. Does the analogy that Aristotle uses 
as part of his scientific reasoning lead to a full-fledged scientific explanation or to something 
lesser, such as a mere reduction of puzzlement, or is it merely a dialectic move and something 
that does not carry any scientific significance at all? Given the richness of Aristotle’s scientific 
treatises, it is likely possible to find examples of each of these cases. The thesis defended in this 
paper, however, is that there are a significant number of instances where analogical reasoning not 
only leads to the generation of a full-fledged scientific explanation, but where the analogical 
reasoning itself provides the only scientific explanation possible given the material at hand. 
Analogical reasoning yields or constitutes explanation insofar as it locates causes and spells them 
out in a way that squares with observations and follows the empirical trail, so to speak. This use 
                                                          
4 A loose characterization of Aristotle’s so-called scientific method is useful to keep in mind: something needing 
explanation is identified (e.g. an aporia); observations, if available, are made and information collected (the stage of 
historia); correlations are expounded (if necessary, reasoning by analogy occurs here), and, from this, comes an 
explanation or, if nothing else, some kind of account that is supposed to reduce the puzzlement (the stage of aitiai). 
5 That said, there may be deeper connections among Aristotle’s theory of analogy (analogia), what it means for 
something to be an analogue (analogon), and analogical reasoning. Especially fruitful in connecting Aristotle’s 
theories and other practices to analogical reasoning are Aristotle’s use of homology (homologia), induction 
(epagôgê), and reasoning by likeness (homoiotês). The appendix of the present essay briefly explores each of these 
in an effort to lay the ground for future work. 
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of analogical thinking is not at all a weakness of Aristotle’s method; rather, his appeal to these 
analogies is one of his greatest strengths and one of the elements of his science that has most 
endured. Moreover, it is a testament to his dedication to empirical knowledge and faith in the 
uniformity of nature and of the four underlying causes. 
Section II introduces the sort of analogy under discussion and begins with an exemplary 
passage of analogical reasoning. The section also identifies what the present essay takes to be the 
characteristics of Aristotle’s reasoning by analogy in scientific contexts. In the remainder of the 
present essay, I use these criteria when discussing specific instances of analogical reasoning. 
Section III gives the bulk of the evidence: it treats Aristotle’s solution of puzzles (missing 
explanations) by way of analogical reasoning in specific passage from De Generatione 
Animalium. Section IV shows the wide-ranging scope of analogical reasoning: this section 
identifies one source domain, cooking, that is very rich and which Aristotle applies to a variety 
of targets. Evidence for this section comes from the Meteorologica and De Partibus Animalium. 
In this section, the emphasis is on the way in which many cases of Aristotle’s scientific 
explanation, even when they are not directly cases of analogical reasoning, are underpinned by 
general inferences from the analogy between craft and nature, in particular the inferences about 
vital heat from the analogy to cooking. Thus, Aristotle does not have to state the analogy 
explicitly in every instance, since he has this host of analogical material on which to draw as 
needed. 
 
II. Seeking Ontological Causes: Characteristics of Analogical Reasoning 
In order to help differentiate cases of reasoning by analogy from those in which Aristotle 
uses analogy for discovery only (i.e. heuristically) or simply as an illustration or exemplification 
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(i.e. didactically), this section analyzes closely one seminal instance of analogical reasoning 
found in De Generatione Animalium II 4 739b20–6. This example is valuable for fleshing out the 
characteristics of analogical reasoning. In this passage, Aristotle is discussing the process of 
fertilization in terms of how the male and female contribute to forming a new organism during 
insemination and how embryogenesis begins: 
the material secreted by the female in the uterus has been fixed by the semen of 
the male (this acts in [almost (paraplêsion)] the same way as rennet acts upon 
milk, for rennet is a kind of milk containing vital heat, which brings into one mass 
and fixes the similar material, and the relation of the semen to the menstrual blood 
in the same, milk and the menstrual blood being of the same nature)….6 
The first hint in this passage is the language. On its own, paraplêsion is insufficient to establish 
reasoning by analogy. Paraplêsion is ambiguous and could mean either in almost the same way 
as or in virtually the same way as. But what paraplêsion does do is help signal that Aristotle is 
bringing together two otherwise separate objects in the form of a comparison. A further 
contributing factor is the causal language, specifically regarding vital heat. Together, these two 
factors are helpful to alert the reader to a possible case of analogical reasoning. 
The parenthetical explanation in the passage comes from the process of fertilization being 
almost the same as the setting of cheese. The analogy, at its core, is this: rennet is to the 
coagulation of milk as male seed is to the fixing of female secretion. Aristotle compares the 
cause in the solidification of curds to the cause in the solidification of the embryo, with the result 
that the analogy evinces rennet as performing almost the same efficient causal role as male 
semen. The causal connection is, first, that both rennet and male semen have a small amount of 
                                                          
6 The paraplêsion is untranslated (omitted without note) in the standard edition of the text, but deserves reinsertion 
here. 
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liquid that has within it the heating power to set and solidify another specific material, and, 
second, the similarity of the materials with which the heat interacts. 
At first glance, one can see that the image of cheese making illustrates and visualizes 
Aristotle’s point. Yet, the analogy exceeds the function of exemplification, insofar as the analogy 
has helped sort out the puzzle of how it is that fertilization in living beings occurs. Aristotle 
could not have directly observed the fertilization process—at least, he would not have been able 
to see it in action. In order to generate an explanation, he needs another area of knowledge that 
he can apply to this particular case. The source domain is introduced by analogy, and, by 
identifying a relevant analogy, he essentially provides the explanation. Given that there is only 
limited empirical evidence about the phenomenon he is trying to explain, his ability to describe 
and explain the sort of mixing and fixation he thinks is at work in fertilization at all depends on 
being able to identify an analogy between a sufficiently relevant causally familiar process and 
the process that is the subject of the investigation. 
 One might object that Aristotle does have sufficient data to form an explanation and, 
thus, that the analogical passage is only illustrative. The likely candidate for providing such 
information is the famous experiment of the Hippocratics in which the observer opens fertilized 
eggs over multiple days. Thus, say those objecting, Aristotle could have observed the setting of 
the embryo in the way he describes. But this objection does not undermine the thrust of my 
point, since Aristotle cannot have observed directly whatever is actually doing the solidification 
(the process of fertilization) as it is occurring, only shortly after it has occurred. Nor could he 
determine from the eggs the elements responsible for the process just from this experiment. An 
explanation would still be absent. Therefore, while the experiment does provide Aristotle with 
more data than it may have seemed at first, it does not elide the need to infer based on analogy. 
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Aristotle aims at giving a causal account that relies on the action of vital heat as it also exists in 
the realm of cheese making. 
Aristotle is, in this passage, engaged in analogical reasoning that aligns two causal 
processes to the effect that one explains the other. With respect to efficient cause and material 
cause (the formal cause is different in both domains), in both cheese making and fertilization, the 
causal functions are alike. In these processes, vital heat is acting on the curdling material, with 
the semen and rennet containing the sources of heat and the milk and menstrual material being 
the same curdled material. The materials are, at base, of the same sort, namely, of the kind 
subject to this particular solidification through the action of vital heat. Thus, the analogy is used 
to reason from a familiar case of curdling material and vital heat to one that is much less 
phenomenally familiar.7 It is not just that fertilization and cheese making are alike enough to 
give the reader a clear picture; rather, the similarity (sameness of the causality in question) 
established allows the elaboration of a point beyond what an illustration would allow. Here, 
Aristotle goes on to say, of both processes, “the more solid part comes together, the liquid is 
separated off from it, and as the earthy parts solidify membranes form all round it” 
(GA.II.4.739b25–7). This is a continuation of the reasoning established in the analogy, a 
                                                          
7 Throughout De Generatione Animalium, Aristotle repeatedly refers to rennet’s coagulation of milk. For further 
analogical reasoning involving rennet and milk see, for instance, De Generatione Animalium I 20 729a11–5, IV 4 
771b18–27. Many of the analogies in Aristotle’s biological works roughly follow examples of analogy already found 
in the ancient medical tradition recorded in the Hippocratic texts, insofar as Aristotle uses analogical reasoning to 
get at the explanation and bases the comparisons on a material similarity. In Aristotle, we find this throughout De 
Generatione Animlaium (as discussed in the present and following sections), as well as in the repeated broad 
analogy to cooking and concoction (as discussed in section IV). Besides retaining their material-laden language, 
Aristotle also retains the sense of causal transference from the source to the target. In the same vein, Aristotle owes 
much to Archytas’s notions of analogy—namely, a wider and more causally near use than might otherwise be 
available—as evidenced in the passages from the Topica cited in the appendix, which are the very same analogies 
Archytas uses and with the same operating principle, definition by the use of similarity (see Huffman 489–507 for 
passages and discussion). 
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continuation that allows him to pursue his main explanation of De Generatione Animalium II 4, 
how the process of embryogenesis begins. 
It is worth stressing how deeply founded is the analogy between the two processes—that 
is, the degree to which one description of the mechanics and material suffices as a causal account 
for both. The way Aristotle draws the analogy, the efficient causal processes are identical—or 
very nearly so—just operating on different types of material. On the general level, the 
descriptions of the actions of the materials involved are alike. This is why Aristotle thinks the 
explanation for both processes must be alike. In other words, if one does not specify the ratio of 
the elements, then there is nothing to differentiate the causal processes (at least given the 
information at hand). At the most basic chemical level—until one specifies the exact substances, 
not their elemental type—the processes of curdling cheese and forming embryos are the same. 
We now have the necessary information to lay out the characteristics of Aristotle’s 
analogical reasoning. The first key consideration is that of observability. In analogies where the 
phenomena of the source and target are both observable, it is plausible that the investigator 
reached the elements in the analogy by means other than analogical reasoning, namely, through 
direct empirical study. In this case, one could take the analogy as an illustration, one that gathers 
its strength from the comparison of two separately determined objects. Thus, the first 
characteristic of analogical reasoning: the analogy aims at explaining something that involves 
unobservable factors. Further, since analogical reasoning yields, as in the above instance from 
De Generatione Animalium II 4, a full-fledged scientific explanation, the analogy must involve 
causality; specifically, the analogical passage must be postulating a cause for the phenomenon 
picked out in the target domain. This postulation of a causal relation is the second characteristic 
of analogical reasoning in Aristotle’s science. If the first consideration is useful for 
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distinguishing between analogical reasoning and analogy as illustration or exemplification 
(analogy used didactically), the third consideration aids in distinguishing between cases of 
analogical reasoning and cases of heuristic use of analogy. To wit, in instances of analogical 
reasoning, not only must the analogy involve causes, as specified by the second consideration, 
but these causes must be explained at the ontological level (although the analogy may also 
involve epistemological causes or result in an epistemological explanation in addition to an 
ontological one). The fourth characteristic is straightforward: the investigator must make an 
inference from the familiar to the unfamiliar; that is, it cannot just be that the familiar provides a 
model for thinking about the unfamiliar. Substantial inference is crucial. The inference is that of 
the causal elements—the affirmation of the hypothesized causal similarity—from the causally 
familiar to the causally unfamiliar. 
These characteristics afford a further chance to distinguish analogical reasoning from the 
heuristic use of analogy and from the merely illustrative use of analogy. In the case of the 
heuristic use, Aristotle often appeals to reasonableness when imaging a comparison. Aristotle 
also tends to state mere reasons why, as opposed to offering causal explanations. While the 
ontological cause could later be determined in addition to this, it would require further 
observation. In cases of analogical reasoning, Aristotle states the similarity outright, introduced, 
often, with paraplêsion, sometimes coupled with hôsper, to indicate resemblance. An excellent 
example of heuristic analogy comes in De Caelo II 12, in which Aristotle invokes the 
comparison of the movement of the wayward stars to the movement of animals. As for the 
illustrative use of analogies, Aristotle’s arguments allow the audience to arrive at the conclusion 
he has already reached by means other than the analogy; thus, he is using the analogy as an 
example to make the conclusion more intelligible or more accessible. Major examples of this are 
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some instances of the analogy between art and nature, such as that used in Physica II 8, where 
Aristotle makes multiple appeals to craft in order to illustrate the teleology of nature and 
concludes with the lines, “If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in nature. The 
best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that” (199b26–30). Reasoning by 
analogy is distinct from both the heuristic and illustrative use: when Aristotle is in the process of 
reasoning by analogy, he uses the analogy as empirical evidence. While the relevant part of the 
target is not observed (hence, the need for the analogical inference), the subject is, nonetheless, 
something that is observable in principle. Besides the above analogical reasoning inferring from 
rennet and milk to semen and menses, there are many other examples, some of which I will 
discuss in the remaining sections. 
 
III. Analogical Reasoning in De Generatione Animalium: The Evidence 
The purpose of the present section is to provide evidence for the argument that there are 
instances of analogical reasoning in Aristotle’s natural science—instances in which the 
analogical reasoning itself provides the scientific explanation Aristotle seeks. The evidence takes 
the form of three representative uses of this kind of analogical reasoning. 
One piece of evidence of analogical reasoning comes in De Generatione Animalium III 2 
753a16–29. Aristotle explains the process of eggs spoiling in an analogy that compares it to wine 
souring: 
it is in the hot season, as we should expect, that the eggs are more apt to be spoilt 
and the so-called “uria” are produced; for just as wines turn sour in the heats from 
the sediment getting stirred up (for this is the cause of their being spoilt), so is it 
with the yolk in eggs, for the sediment and yolk are the earthy part in each case, 
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and that is why the wine becomes turbid when the sediment mixes with it, and the 
like applies to the eggs that are spoiling because of the yolk. 
The key elements of the causal story are heat, the earthy elements, agitation, and spoilage. Heat 
agitates the earthy element that is the sediment in the wine, which spoils the wine. That is, 
Aristotle compares wine spoilage to egg spoilage in a way that identifies the same causal 
process: heat agitates the earthy element that is the yolk in the egg, which spoils the egg. The 
only substitutions in the elements of the analogy are the egg for the wine and the yoke of the egg 
for the sediment of the wine. The causal comparison is quite strong, and Aristotle makes it in the 
framework of strict analogy. 
The case is one of analogical reasoning and fits the characteristics that I identify above, 
namely, that the phenomenon in need of explanation cannot be observed very well, that the 
analogy involves causality, that the explanation identifies real, ontological causes as opposed to 
mere epistemic ones, and that there is an inference from a causally familiar domain to causally 
unfamiliar domain. As for observability, the phenomenon of egg spoilage is unobservable as it 
occurs inside the shell, while wine spoilage is more easily observable and, this is key, much 
more causally familiar to Aristotle and his audience. Note that whether the causality Aristotle 
attributes to the familiar case is correct is not of great importance here; rather, what demands 
attention is the transfer of this causal explanation to the unfamiliar case. The major culprit for the 
lack of empirical evidence is the impossibility of his observing the stirring up of yolky sediment 
in the egg. As for locating the cause, Aristotle seeks to explain egg spoilage, since the reason for 
the spoilage is not readily apparent. As for inference, there are causal inferences drawn: wine 
spoilage is more familiar, the cause being readily available in what is observable. Lastly, as for 
the nature of the causes, the causes at which Aristotle aims are not merely epistemological, but 
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are also ontological. Notice further that there is no appeal to the reasonableness of the inference 
or an introduction that expresses doubt about the possibility of explaining the phenomenon at 
hand, as would be expected or characteristic in a heuristic use. 
Let me, in support of my thesis, discuss two further paradigmatic examples of analogical 
reasoning in De Generatione Animalium. As I mentioned in my introduction, this is a treatise in 
which we especially expect to find such cases, since embryology is an empirically 
underdetermined domain relative to the other domains of natural investigation. The first passage 
of interest is De Generatione Animalium III 4 755a13–26. Aristotle compares the rapid growth of 
certain eggs to the similar growth of what we now know as yeast: 
The growth of the egg is like that of a grub, for those animals which produce 
grubs give birth to a small thing at first and this grows by itself and not through 
any attachment to the parent. The reason is similar [paraplêsion] to that of the 
growth of yeast, for yeast also grows great from a small beginning as the more 
solid part liquefies and the liquid is aerated. This is effected in animals by the 
nature of the vital heat, in yeasts by the heat of the juice commingled with them. 
The eggs then grow of necessity through this cause (for they have in them a 
yeasty residue), but also for the sake of what is better; for it is impossible for them 
to attain their whole growth in the uterus because these animals have so many 
eggs. 
Note, first, that just as in the milk and rennet example from De Generatione Animalium II 4 that I 
discuss above, Aristotle uses paraplêsion to introduce a comparison. While the above noted 
caveats to the usage of paraplêsion still apply, the occurrence of this word supports the fact that 
Aristotle introduces an analogy. While both the source (yeast growth) and the target (rapid egg 
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growth) are, in many ways, observable, the mechanism that causes the rapid expansion of the 
number of egg is not. The motivation for the comparison is that Aristotle seeks the causes of the 
rapid growth of certain eggs, and the explanation is not immediately apparent from the 
observable instances. Thus, the analogical case of yeast functions to provide the causal 
explanation, namely, by indicating the action of the material: the “solid part liquefies and the 
liquid is aerated.” While, in stating that the process happens of necessity and for the best, 
Aristotle includes both a material and a teleological explanation, by introducing this analogy, he 
also identifies the efficient cause of the phenomenon, namely, the specific action of the heat of 
the juice. This is also, then, an inference of causality from the familiar to the unfamiliar: from the 
already explained action of heat on the yeast, the liquefying of the solid part and the aeration of 
the liquid part, Aristotle infers that the same process is happening in the case of the eggs, a case 
that was unexplained before this inference. This instance of analogical reasoning is in line with 
the rennet and milk passage analyzed in section II and does not deviate from the main points: the 
causal affinity between source and target is based on an equality of the underlying causes of heat 
and similar material composition. While this material focus testifies to the depth of the 
analogical similarity, there are other sorts of examples as well. 
 In De Generatione Animalium V 7 787b20–788a10, Aristotle uses analogical reasoning to 
yield an explanation, but this time the causal agent has nothing to do with vital heat and its action 
on conglomerations of materials. In this passage, Aristotle uses mechanics as his source domain 
and draws an analogy between weaving and the tension of fibers to vocal cord slackening: 
All animals when castrated change to the female character, and utter a voice like 
that of the females because the sinewy strength in the principle of the voice is 
relaxed. This relaxation is just as if [paraplesia] one should stretch a string and 
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make it taut by hanging some weight on to it, as [hôsper] women do who weave 
at the loom, for they stretch the warp by attaching stone weights to it. For in this 
way are the testes attached to the seminal passages, and these again to the blood-
vessel which takes its origin in the heart near the organ which sets the voice in 
motion. … If the testes are removed the tension of the passages relaxes, as when 
the weight is taken off the string or the warp; as this relaxes, the principle which 
moves the voice is loosened in the same proportion. This, then, is the reason why 
the voice and the form generally change to the female character in castrated 
animals; it is because the principle is relaxed upon which depends the tension of 
the body…. 
Here, as elsewhere, there are linguistic signals: this time, hôsper (just as) accompanies 
paraplesia, giving us a hint to examine the case more carefully. Obviously, the phenomenon 
Aristotle wishes to explain, the voice change of male animals due to castration, is unobservable 
in its mechanism; what is unobservable is that which connects the castration to the voice change. 
Where his empirical purchase runs out, stopping at the correlation of castration and voice 
change, Aristotle seeks, by way of analogical reasoning, a causal account of the changing of 
voice to the female state in males after castration. One might insist, on the contrary, that, since 
Aristotle states the causes before giving the analogical components, what follows in the text is an 
illustration. However, it is apparent that the unobservability of the slackening corresponding to 
voice change prevents this line of argument. Aristotle goes on to infer causality from familiar to 
unfamiliar, from the loom and what happens in weaving to the castration process and slackening. 
And this causal explanation aims at the ontological: it provides an account of the way in which 
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castration affects voice change. In both source and target, the same principle of bodily tension is 
active and then made inactive. 
Unlike the examples canvased so far, this passage of analogical reasoning does not 
involve an organic to organic inference (sc. cheese making and fertilization, wine spoilage and 
egg spoilage, and yeast growth and egg growth). Additionally, while Aristotle reasons by 
material similarity, he discusses a different active cause than vital heat, namely, the principle of 
tautness. He also grounds his explanation in a general background of mechanics. These points of 
difference reveal a more significant similarity: much more important than organic to organic 
analogy or vital heat is the fact that this weaving analogy is an analogy between craft (here, 
mechanics or the inorganic) and nature (the organic), which has a long history in ancient Greek 
thought and is widely used by Aristotle. Moreover, we can understand the other examples cited 
in the present essay from this perspective of the analogy between craft and nature (sc. cheese 
making, wine making, and crafts that use yeast). It is with this broad craft analogy of Aristotle in 
mind that analogical reasoning takes on wider import: reasoning by analogical association lies at 
the heart of Aristotle’s causal account and explanation of nature via craft. 
 
IV. The Importance of Inferences from Craft to Nature: The Cooking Analogy in the 
Meteorologica and De Partibus Animalium 
The analogy between craft and nature is one of the most pervasive, most important, and 
most talked about analogies in the Aristotelian corpus; yet, it is only ever discussed for its 
educational purposes. What I want to show, here, is that, in some cases, the analogy to craft is 
also used for explanatory purposes. The rich source material the craft analogy provides—in 
cheese making (GA.II.4.739b20–6, the case of fertilization), wine making (GA.III.2.753a16–29, 
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the case of wine souring and eggs spoiling), baking or brewing (GA.III.4.755a13–26, the case of 
yeast and egg growth), and weaving (GA.V.7.787b20–788a10, the case of castration and vocal 
cord slackening), as we have seen already—offers much for individual cases of analogical 
reasoning, individual instances where observation no longer furnishes adequate information for 
Aristotle to generate explanations just on the basis of that. But this is not the end of its 
importance. The craft analogy also appears in many places that do not immediately fit the criteria 
of analogical reasoning used as explanation, such as the appeal in De Generatione Animalium II 
6 743b18–25 to nature being like a painter and drawing the outline of the organism before filling 
it in with the internal organs.8 Nevertheless, Aristotle does, at times, appeal to craft as an 
explanation of nature in a more general way that is consistent with analogical reasoning. One 
such appeal comes in the Meteorologica IV 1–3, which provides a source for Aristotle’s widely 
used cooking analogy, but here used in a non-embryological context. The importance, here, lies 
in the fact of how many meteorological phenomena can be explained by analogy to phenomena 
that involve cooking. The way in which Aristotle talks of concoction in De Partibus Animalium 
provides further evidence.9 
Aristotle begins the fourth book of the Meteorologica by stating the sorts of changes the 
elements and their properties produce and their division into the active, the hot and the cold, and 
the passive, the dry and the moist. In line with my comments above about the similarity (or 
identity) of types of causal processes—for instance, recall how egg spoilage and wine souring 
                                                          
8 The full comparison of nature to a painter runs as follows: “The upper half of the body, then, is first marked out in 
the order of development; as time goes on the lower also reaches its full size in the sanguinea. All the parts are first 
marked out in their outlines and acquire later on their colour and softness or hardness, exactly as if nature were a 
painter producing a work of art, for painters, too, first sketch in the animal with lines and only after that put in the 
colours.” 
9 While the English cooking and concoction refer to the same Greek pepsis, generally, throughout the present 
section, cooking is used to refer to the source domain and concoction is used to refer to the casual explanation that 
Aristotle transfers. 
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are indistinguishable without specifying the material, since the cause of both going bad is the 
working up of the earthy part (differentiated as yoke and sediment) by heat—Aristotle indicates 
the importance of the ratios of these materials (elements) for differentiating different sorts of 
objects. As he puts it, “Unqualified natural becoming is a change introduced by these powers 
into the matter underlying a given natural thing when they are in a certain ratio; and matter is the 
passive qualities we have mentioned” (378b33–379a1). At this point, Aristotle also discusses the 
case where the active principles are insufficient, inconcoction, the failure to heat the material 
properly, and uses language that refers to imperfect boiling. 
In the second chapter, Aristotle introduces the successful sort of action on the passive; 
this process is concoction, which is due to heat: “Concoction is a process in which the natural 
and proper heat of an object perfects the corresponding passive qualities, which are the proper 
matter of any given object” (379b18–20). Recall that most of the examples of analogical 
reasoning that constitute explanations in De Generatione Animalium identify this vital heat as the 
efficient cause of the phenomenon to be explained. The activity of vital heat is not directly 
observable, so it makes sense that this is an area where Aristotle uses analogies frequently. The 
classes of vital heat that make up concoction are established by analogy—Aristotle identifies 
species of concoction based on various methods of cooking: “We must recognize that the things 
are not properly denoted by these words: the various classes of similar objects have no names 
universally applicable to them; consequently we must think of the species enumerated as being 
not what those words denote but something like it” (379b14–6). In the form Aristotle gives it 
here, he has obscured the analogical nature of the comparison. In its fully spelled out form, the 
instances of analogical inference from known cooking to unknown causal action (the action of 
the cause of vital heat in general, the concoction) become clear. Thus, cooking (the original 
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meaning of concoction) acts on various material cooked as vital heat (what Aristotle describes as 
concocting) acts on various material heated. 
This is not a simple analogical inference either. The difference is not just in sorts of 
material heated—solid, liquid, sinew, and so on—but there are related differences in the sort of 
concocting that occurs. That is, just as cooking is divided into various sorts—ripening, boiling, 
broiling—so too is concoction; inconcoction, which is due to excess cold, is similarly 
differentiated, respectively into rawness, parboiling, scorching (379b11–3). This is to say, the 
types of concoction are identified and described—their ontological character pinpointed—based 
on the categories and action of causes in cooking. Concoction (pepsis), as has been said, is the 
vital heat acting in proper natural proportion (379b18–20). Aristotle states further, “Things that 
undergo a process of concoction necessarily become thicker and hotter; for the action of heat is 
to make things more compact, thicker, and drier” (380a4–6). 
The third chapter of the book contains further development of the species of concoction. 
While ripening (pepansis) obviously applies to fruit, Aristotle notes the same causal process 
occurs elsewhere: “the general character of the process [of ripening] being the same … the word 
is applied by an extension of meaning” (380a4–6). Ripening in this extended meaning gleaned 
from analogical inference (although no longer used strictly in the form of an analogy) is 
described as follows: “everything that ripens turns from an airy into a watery state, and from a 
watery into an earthy state, and in general from being rare becomes dense. In this process nature 
incorporates some of the matter in itself, and some it rejects” (380a24–7). Boiling (hepsêsis) also 
has extended analogical meaning. While boiling is, generally, “a concoction by moist heat of the 
indeterminate matter contained in the moisture,” Aristotle notes, “the word is strictly applicable 
only to things boiled in the way of cooking” (380b12–4). Nevertheless, the extent of material that 
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is boiled is great; food, drink, medicine, and others all might be acted upon by boiling (380b36–
381a2). Even though Aristotle limits the scope at first, he concludes the definition of boiling with 
a very strong statement of the similarity between the craft (cooking) cases and the natural 
(concoction) cases: “the process is the same in an artificial and in a natural instrument, for the 
cause will be the same in every case” (381a10–1). Broiling or roasting (optêsis) is heating that 
comes from a dry, external heat (381a24). Again, to drive home the point of the similarity in the 
causal process of craft and nature, Aristotle says of both boiling and broiling, they are “artificial 
processes, but the same general kind of thing, as we said, is found in nature too” (381b4–5). The 
types of inconcoction (apepsia)—rawness (ômotês), parboiling (molunsis), and scorching 
(stateusis)—are likewise based in the analogy to cooking and are failures of the respective 
processes. 
Aristotle uses the notions of concoction, inconcoction, and their subspecies, as introduced 
in the Meteorologica, for particular explanations in De Partibus Animalium (as well as the 
Historia Animalium and, of course, in De Generatione Animalium). Surveying a few examples 
from De Partibus Animalium gives us a sense of just how ubiquitous Aristotle’s explanations of 
this sort are. Again, while many are not presented as analogical reasoning, the causal language 
used is the same as was theorized in the Meteorologica, theorizing which is based on the analogy 
between the development of food and other products by craft and the development of various 
substances by nature. The production and effects of blood are frequently explained in terms of 
concoction. One such instance comes in De Partibus Animalium II 4 651a17–8: “The watery part 
of the blood is serum [ichôr]; and it is watery, either owing to its not being yet concocted, or 
owing to its having become corrupted or else watery blood….” Thus, it is the action of 
concoction (generally, by vital heat) that is responsible for the blood’s proper formation. The 
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spleen can help finish the job of concoction for bloodlike fluids, as Aristotle explains at De 
Partibus Animalium III 7 670a27–670b7: “the spleen attracts the residual humours from the 
stomach, and owing to its bloodlike character is enabled to assist in their concoction” (670b4–6). 
The association with blood and concoction caries over, since it is because of the specific 
character of the residue, it being like blood, that the spleen can assist. The existence of the spleen 
in the animals that have spleens is explained by the existence of residues that need to be more 
fully formed. This working up of the matter is a sort of concoction and, as with the concoction 
described in the Meteorlogica, this cooks off the watery part of the residue. In De Partibus 
Animalium III 14, there is much discussion that concerns the esophagus and stomach (and similar 
discussion continues in the next chapter and book).10 Digestion is, like blood, another place 
where the language of concoction typically appears. Here, the specific focus is on differentiating 
stomachs by the differences in concoction. Take one example: “When, however, an animal is of 
large size, and feeds on substances of so thorny and ligneous a character as to be difficult of 
concoction, it may in consequence have several stomachs, as for instance is the case with the 
camel” (674a26–31). Thus, it is the particular nature of what needs to be concocted and the 
capabilities of concoction that explain the sort of stomach large animals have. 
The diversity and frequency of Aristotle’s explanations by way of concoction have not 
gone entirely unnoticed, and G. E. R. Lloyd similarly sees them as based in the analogy to 
cooking (although he does not fit this into the framework of analogical reasoning). In “The 
master cook” in his Aristotelian explorations, Lloyd details—mentioning the above examples 
                                                          
10 In De Partibus Animalium III 15, we find another discussion of rennet and coagulation, which seems to have the 
unstated background of cheese making as a source: “It is the thick character of their milk which causes all these 
animals to have rennet; whereas in animals with a single stomach the milk is thin, and consequently no rennet is 
formed. That is why the milk of horned animals coagulates, while that of animals without horns does not. Rennet 
forms in the hare because it feeds on herbage that has juice like that of the fig; for juice of this kind coagulates the 
milk in the stomach of the sucklings” (676a12–9). 
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and many others—how widespread this language is. Lloyd further sees it for the practical 
investigative tool it is, even if he has ultimate reservations about its legitimacy. As for its 
strength and flexibility, Lloyd writes of the use of concoction in Aristotle’s natural science, “The 
great strength of Aristotle’s use of the idea of concoction lies, in general, in the way it enables 
him to see the connections between widely disparate phenomena and processes” (95). This is 
precisely the power of analogical reasoning, to draw inference from an outside domain, which 
may have, at first, appeared unrelated. Lloyd then criticizes—in a way, rightly—Aristotle’s use 
for being less than rigorous: “But the corresponding weakness is in the very vagueness or 
generality of the concept—which is what allows him to suggest those connections. To put it 
another way, the connections he apprehends run ahead of the theoretical explanations he can 
offer” (95). Indeed, as Lloyd notes, even the fundamental categories of hot, cold, wet, and dry—
which are employed to explain numerous processes in these appeals to concoction and 
elsewhere—are themselves open to interpretation and are insufficiently defined (96). 
What is important is that Aristotle applies so widely these causal explanations derived 
originally from the analogy to cooking. Each of the above cases (and the plethora of examples 
not recounted here) is underpinned by the general inferences Aristotle has already made—
inferences of the behavior of heat in various sorts of cooking applied to cases of various sorts of 
vital heat. Aristotle may apply these categories and the explanations they bring too vigorously, 
but this is a result of his scientific concern for the uniformity of explanation. Given the extent to 
which analogical inferences underwrite Aristotle’s general description of vital heat, we see it has 
a wider scope; that is, it extends to the cause of vital heat in general, since direct observation of 
the action of heat does not immediately provide an explanation for what the heat does in each 
case on each material. Aristotle has to turn to cooking for such an explanation—at the general 
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causal level, as in the Meteorologica, and in the specific explanations of ontological causes, as in 
De Partibus Animalium. This analogical reasoning extends beyond cases of particular 
explanation, since the action of vital heat itself is characterized by causal inferences. 
 
V. Conclusion: The Importance of Analogy and Analogical Reasoning in Aristotle 
In Aristotle’s natural science, analogical reasoning plays a significant role. When direct 
observation fails, he is left with at least one way to produce an explanation—that is, if he can 
find the relevant familiar, ontologically causal cases from which to infer to the phenomenon that 
demands explanation. Especially in his De Generatione Animalium, analogical reasoning serves 
as explanation. But Aristotle, in De Partibus Animalium (among other treatises), also provides 
explanations that, while not strictly cases of analogical reasoning, are underpinned both generally 
and specifically by the analogy of cooking and concoction, which he explicates in the 
Meteorologica. This testifies to just how deep the analogical reasoning goes in Aristotle. Thus, 
analogical reasoning, while not directly theorized in Aristotle, is a key part of his scientific 
investigation. 
Although, in the present essay, it has been necessary to distinguish sharply between cases 
of analogical reasoning and other cases of analogy in order to bring analogical reasoning into 
distinct relief, interesting advancements may come from focusing on the very way in which these 
categories of analogy are not strictly maintained in Aristotle’s natural science. That is, once the 
possibility for causality and explanation are understood as real valences of the analogies that 
have been treated here as instances of reasoning by analogy, much more terrain is opened up for 
a broader, fuller, and more dynamic understanding of analogy in Aristotle’s natural science. 
Another area for future research is the way in which areas Aristotle has theorized more fully 
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might be brought into dialogue with the sorts of explanation Aristotle generates with the causal 
inference that analogy allows (see the appendix for gestures in this direction). Despite the myriad 
of other sorts of comparisons and uses of analogy, however, it remains important to grasp 
analogical reasoning as a significant, substantial, and enduring part of Aristotle’s natural science, 
one that persists in scientific practice today. 
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Appendix 
I. Homology (Homologia) 
Homology is worth examining because it shares an important feature with analogical 
reasoning. The existence or absence of a part or function can be used to explain the behavior of 
another part or function (or why it is absent) in a way similar to the inference of causality 
(although not the inference of a full explanation) from a source to a target domain. 
In homology (homologia)—the case where things are analogues, although their causes 
are not related by generic similarity—the final cause is typically the same, while the other causes 
may require additional explanation. For example, lungs and gills fulfill the same function of 
being for warmth, but explanation of how the gills come to be is different from that of the lungs. 
These cases (as with heuristic cases) relate to an assessment by reasonableness: the homology 
comes from a source domain in a way that sets up what one might expect to find in a very near 
target domain. This is obvious by a sort of negative example, those cases where Aristotle finds 
something is absent from an animal where it might otherwise be expected. These often are of a 
mode in which the expectation is incorrect; thus, the homology picks out the absence of 
something in the target object. These analogies have substantial weight, since it is often due to 
such homologies that Aristotle feels compelled to explain the absence. Aristotle commonly uses 
this mode of investigation in De Incessu Animalium and De Partibus Animalium, such as when 
he investigates why snakes have no feet though the rest of the sanguine land-dwellers are footed 
or when Aristotle needs to explain why birds have no outer ears though all other sanguine 
quadruped ovi- and vivipara have outer ears (IA.8.708a9–20, PA.II.12.657a19–25; see Leunissen 
115 and Lennox 214). 
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II. Induction (Epagôgê) 
As for induction (epagôgê) or the examples on which one performs the induction, 
Aristotle sometimes speaks of induction in conjunction with analogy, as in Metaphysica Λ 5. 
While this is different from the sense of analogy discussed in the present essay, the inductive 
move resembles the initial inference in cases of analogy. 
In Aristotle’s use, one inducts from analogue cases to a higher principle that is evidenced 
in the similarity of the analogues. These are analogies in which concrete examples are given in 
the source domain, and one is invited to abstract from these examples and move up to a target 
domain that belongs to a higher level of generality; this target object is the general form of the 
analogical commonality. Aristotle usually uses this type of analogy when it looks like there is no 
other reasonable way to get a grasp on the target domain, because, for instance, definition of it is 
impossible. Take Metaphysica Θ 6, where Aristotle is trying to get his reader to get a grasp of the 
notions of actuality (energeia): “What we wish to say is clear by induction from particular cases, 
and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy” 
(1048a35–7). The elements from which one abstracts include seeing and walking. There really is 
no other way to gain an understanding of these notions except by providing this series of 
examples. In this case, we actually have an example of typical Aristotelian analogy: as walking 
is to the capacity to walk, so actuality is to potentiality; as seeing is to the capacity to see, so 
actuality is to potentiality. In the analogies, the universals function as particulars, in that they are 
compared to particular instances. The induction accompanies this, however, in that we are to 
grasp actuality–potentiality universally. There are also cases in which induction serves alongside 
other possible evidence. For example, in De Partibus Animalium II 1 646a25–31, which 
compares house building to the order of development and the order of substance and which 
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speaks of the comparison as induction, Aristotle also indicates the conclusion, “For that which is 
posterior in the order of development is antecedent in the order of nature, and that is genetically 
last which in nature is first,” can also be shown by argument. 
 
III. Likeness (Homoiotês) 
The core argument defended in this paper—that Aristotle uses analogical reasoning to 
find ontological causes and explain phenomena therewith—does not require Aristotle to have 
given a formal account of analogical reasoning. However, Aristotle’s arguments from likeness 
(homoiotês) may have characteristics similar to analogical reasoning.11 
Even though there is no account of analogical reasoning given in the Analytica 
Posteriora, for example, that does not mean that analogical reasoning is not in Aristotle’s 
scientific repertoire, as evidenced throughout the present essay. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s use of 
analogical reasoning is compatible with, and is possibly partially derivable from, Aristotle’s own 
theory of arguments from likeness. This is most directly discussed in Topica I 17. While 
Aristotle’s account of analogia mostly deals with establishing (primarily) four-term proportional 
relation, his brief account of homoiotês—an account that clearly involves analogies—can be read 
as alluding to inference and explanation. Aristotle provides a very brief formal account of 
arguments from likeness that outline the general contours of an argument from analogy. He gives 
the formula for alike things that are of different genera at Topica I 17 108a6–10:12 
                                                          
11 Other useful passages provide evidence for further connection. These include Aristotle’s theory of analogy as a 
subspecies of metaphor (Poetica 21) and its relation to his theory of discrete analogies of four terms (outlined in 
Ethica Nicomachea V 3, along with continuous analogies of three terms, Metaphysica Δ 6, and Topica 17). Also 
informative is Aristotle’s discussion of argument from example (paradeigma). Relevant passages on argument from 
example include Rhetorica II 25 1402b14–7 and Analytica Priora II 24 68b1–20. 
12 He states the other sort of investigation of likeness, that of things belonging to the same genus, next in the chapter: 
“We should also look at things which belong to the same genus, to see if any identical attribute belongs to them all, 
e.g. to a man and a horse and a dog; for in so far as they have any identical attribute, in so far they are alike” 
(Top.I.17.108a13–7). 
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as one is to one thing, so is another to another (e.g. as knowledge stands to the 
object of knowledge, so is perception related to the object of perception), or: as 
one is in one thing, so is another in another (e.g. as sight is in the eye, so is 
intellect in the soul, and as is a calm in the sea, so is windlessness in the air). 
While this formal account does come in the context of discussing dialectic, one should not be too 
hasty to discount it as having a possible theoretical tie to the scientific practice of analogical 
reasoning (nor should one discount out of hand the coexistence dialectic and scientific 
investigation). The examples Aristotle gives are very telling. These analogies are all of the 
discrete analogy form, A is to B as C is to D (as opposed to the continuous analogy form, A is to 
B as C is to B), and they relate properties and objects. The first analogy, “as knowledge stands to 
the object of knowledge, so is perception related to the object of perception,” establishes analogy 
by a subject–object relation. The second analogy, “as sight is in the eye, so is intellect in the 
soul,” uses a capacity–actualizer relation. And the third analogy, “as is a calm in the sea, so is 
windlessness in the air,” relies on a likeness of property with respect to material. What is striking 
about these examples is that—while they are not full-fledged explanations and are much more of 
a description than a case of analogical reasoning—if one of the sides of the analogy involved an 
unfamiliar process, it would be much clearer how this relates to analogical reasoning, since 
Aristotle would then be making an inference. There are, then, important structural similarities 
between Aristotle’s account of homoiotês here and his use of analogical reasoning in the 
scientific treatises. Aristotle’s comment in Topica VIII 1 156b10–16 supports this point: 
the universal involved is less patent [in arguments from likeness]; e.g. that as 
knowledge and ignorance of contraries is the same, so too perception of contraries 
is the same…. This argument resembles induction, but is not the same thing; for 
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in induction it is the universal whose admission is secured from the particulars, 
whereas in arguments from likeness, what is secured is not the universal under 
which all the like cases fall. 
In successful arguments from likeness, the arguer secures a sort of local induction, the one case 
abstracted in the relevant way and applied to the other. This resembles closely the inferences of 
analogical reasoning. The universal is involved but is not readily apparent or the final object of 
the comparison. The general principle is a sort of midway point that unites the side of the 
analogy. For example, as examined above, in the case of the coagulation of milk by rennet and 
menses by semen, the two cases are analogous in that both are instances of vital heat working up 
matter that can be formed in this way. In cases of arguments from likeness, the aim is to secure 
the acceptance of the target case as relevantly alike. Analogical reasoning goes a step further, in 
that it is not a technique of dialectic; it is, rather, a technique of science for arriving at 
ontological causes. In a strong sense, then, the causes singled out in the inferential operation do 
not stand or fall on any interlocutor’s acceptance or denial of them. Once identified, the causes 
and the explanation they produce stand on their own. 
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